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LEGISLATION
NEW YORK UNIFORM SUPPORT OF DEPENDENTS LAW-ITS
OPERATION TO DATE
The family is the basic unit of American society and the foun-
dation upon which our culture rests. Membership in a family creates
a relationship out of which arise certain rights and corresponding
duties. One of such duties is the obligation of support. It is in the
best interests of the state and the nation as a whole that this duty be
enforced. Prior to the enactment of reciprocal support legislation, the
methods of enforcing this duty against obligors who crossed state
lines were cumbersome, expensive and rarely, if ever, utilized by
those entitled to support.
At common law a husband had a duty to support his wife,1 and
a parent a duty to support his children.2 However, since neither wife
nor child could sue a husband-father, the duty of support was enforce-
able only through a third party.3 Moreover, it was not an indictable
offense at common law for a husband to neglect to provide the neces-
sities of life for his wife.4 Although today a husband-father may,
under certain circumstances, be prosecuted criminally for non-
support," this remedy, in and of itself, is not sufficient to accomplish
the underlying objectives of support legislation, viz., support of de-
pendents and relief of the financial burden on the state. If he has
fled the jurisdiction, the cost of extradition proceedings often discour-
ages prosecution of the runaway husband-father.6 Furthermore,
assuming a deserter is prosecuted and convicted, the net result is that
the state merely has another individual to support out of public funds.
' Sanford v. Karpinski, 63 N.Y.S.2d 756, 759 (Sup. Ct. 1946) (dictum);
III VEaRNE, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 153 (1935).
2Van Valkinburgh v. Watson, 13 Johns. R. 480 (N.Y. 1816) (per curiam)
(dictum); Santasiero v. Briggs, 278 App. Div. 15, 18, 103 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4(3d Dep't 1951) (dictum).
3 For example, a merchant who had supplied necessities to a wife or child.
Brown, The Duty Of The Husband To Support The Wife, 18 VA. L. REv. 823,
843 (1932) ; IV VERNIER, op. cit. supra note 1, § 234 (1936).
4 III VERNIER, op. cit. supra note 1, § 162.
5 N.Y. PEN. LAW §§ 50, 480.
6 U.S. CoNssr. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2, provides that a person charged with a
felony "who shall flee from Justice" shall be delivered up by one state to the
state from which he fled. In many cases it is not true that an obligor has fled
from justice. He may have entered another state to secure employment. See
Brockelbank, The Problem of Family Support: A New Unsiform Act Offers
a Solution, 37 A.B.A.J. 93, 94 (1951).
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Prior to the passage of the New York Uniform Support of
Dependents Law, 7 the civil remedies available to a dependent were,
for all practical purposes, limited to cases where a deserter was pres-
ent within the jurisdiction.8 If a deserter left the state, but had prop-
erty within the jurisdiction, a proceeding quasi-in-rem might have
been employed and support received from the proceeds of the prop-
erty.9 In the event that a deserter had not set up a new domicile in
a foreign jurisdiction, a judgment could be rendered against him in
an action commenced by process served personally without the state.10
This procedure, however, was inadequate to meet the exigencies of
the situation since such a judgment is entitled to full faith and credit
only as to past accrued amounts." Further, it was hardly likely that
a destitute dependent would have the finances necessary to travel to
another jurisdiction for the purpose of instituting an action on that
judgment.
New York Uniform Support of Dependents Law
The increasing mobility of our population, the enormous cost to
the state due to expanding relief rolls,'2 and the inability of the law
to effectively aid needy dependents led to the enactment of the New
York Uniform Support of Dependents Law.' 3  Fundamentally, the
New York law is a simple two-state operation whereby a dependent,
who wishes to start an action against a person in another state who is
liable for the petitioner's support, institutes a proceeding in the county
of the state wherein he resides or is domiciled. 14 The court certifies
that the respondent cannot be served with process within the state and
transmits the petition to the appropriate court of the responding state,' 5
7 Laws of N.Y. 1949, c. 807.8 N.Y. CHUDREI's CT. AcT §§ 30-34; N.Y.C. Dom. REa.. CT. ACT §§ 91-
159.
9 N.Y. Civ. PRc. AcT §§ 232, 1171-a.
10 Id. §235.
21 Sistare v. Sistare 218 U.S. 1 (1910); Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U.S. 183
(1901) (by implication); Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1858);
Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77, 80 (1944) (dictum). Some state courts, how-
ever, have enforced decrees of future support through comity. See Rule v.
Rule, 313 Ill. App. 108, 39 N.E.2d 379 (1942); Ostrander v. Ostrander, 190
Minn. 547, 252 N.W. 449 (1934) ; McKeel v. McKeel, 185 Va. 108, 37 S.E.2d
746 (1946).
12The amount expended by the states to support deserted dependents is
$200,000,000 a year. See Commissioners' Prefatory Note to the UNIFORM
RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT, 9A U.L.A. 74 (Supp. 1955).
13 N.Y. UNIFORM SUPPORT OF DE-ENDENTS LAW § 2111 (hereinafter this
statute will be referred to as the New York law). This law has also been
adopted by Georgia, Illinois and Iowa.
24Id. § 2116(a). The New York law applies equally to an obligor who is
present within the state. Id. § 2116(b), Hansen v. Hansen, 207 Misc. 589, 142
N.Y.S2d 248 (Child. Ct. 1955).
'5 N.Y. UNIFORM SUPPORT OF DEPENDENTS LAW § 2116(c). "In the event
that the court shall have before it satisfactory evidence that the respondent is
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which state has a substantially similar or reciprocal law.' 6 The court
of the responding state issues a summons 17 to bring the respondent
before the court.'8 If the respondent enters a verified denial of the
petition, the court of the responding state sends a transcript of the
minutes to the court of the initiating state, showing the denials entered
by the respondent.19 Upon receipt of the transcript, the court of the
initiating state takes such proof as it deems proper and forwards a
transcript of such proof to the court of the responding state. 20 The
respondent has the right to reply to such proof and to cross-examine
petitioner and petitioner's witnesses by deposition or written inter-
rogatories. The petitioner is afforded this same right.21 If the court
of the responding state finds that the petition is supported by the
evidence, it will issue an order directing the respondent to furnish
support.22 The support payments are paid into the court of the re-
sponding state and forwarded to the court of the initiating state, which
in turn channels the payments to the petitioner. 23
Jurisdiction
While the only requirement for jurisdiction over the respondent
is his presence within the state,24 the test of jurisdiction over the peti-
tioner is his residence within the state.2 5 Section 2113 of the New
York law provides that an obligor is liable for the support of a de-
pendent "residing or found in..., another state." The words "found
in" can have no meaning in relation to jurisdiction over a petitioner
in light of the minimum requirement of domicile or residence contained
in Section 2115 which enumerates the circumstances under which an
action is maintainable. If the words are given effect as defining the
jurisdictional requirements for the petitioner, it would then be possible
not within the initiating state or cannot be served with process there, the sum-
mons and affidavit required herein may be omitted and the certificate shall
contain a statement of the reasons for said omissions and the pertinent evidence
supporting the same." Laws of N.Y. 1956, c. 150.
laId. §2115.
17 For wilfully failing to appear, a respondent may be punished in the same
manner as provided by law for such a violation in any other action cognizable
by such court. Id. § 2116(J).
is Id. § 2116(d).
19Id. § 2116(f).
20 Id. § 2116(g).
21Id. § 2116(i).
22 Id. § 2116(k). A wilful failure to comply with an order may be, pun-
ished by contempt in the same manner as provided by law in any other pro-
ceedings. Id. §2116(m).
23 Id. § 2116(1), (p).
24 Id. § 2115. A non-resident who voluntarily enters a state as a party to
litigation is not present in that state within the meaning of Section 2115.
Cf. "Hodges" v. "Hodges," 202 Misc. 71, 108 N.Y.S.2d 286 (N.Y. Dom. Rel.
Ct. 1951).
25 N.Y. UNIFORM SUPPORT oF DEPENDENTS LAv § 2115.
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for a non-resident dependent to avail himself of the judicial machinery
and administrative agencies of the state merely by entering the state
for the sole purpose of commencing suit. It is doubtful that the legis-
lature contemplated such a handling of support payments by the ini-
tiating state for the benefit of a dependent residing without the state.
The words "found in," however, may have been used to cover a situa-
tion where the state is suing under Section 2115-a 26 to recover money
expended by it in caring for a dependent abandoned within this state.
2 7
Choice of Law
It is not clear from the statute itself which law should apply in
a given situation-the law of the initiating state or that of the respond-
ing state. Section 2113 declares that a person in one state is liable
for the support of a dependent in another state "having substantially
similar or reciprocal laws." 25 The problem of a conflict between the
duties of support imposed by the initiating state and those of the re-
sponding state will not arise in the ordinary situation, since all states
agree on the most common duties of support, i.e., husband liable for
wife, father liable for his children.2 9 Section 2113, however, lists
seven duties of support which provide fertile ground for conflict.80
26 "Whenever the state . . . is furnishing support ... it shall have the same
right to invoke the provisions of this act as the dependent to whom the duty
of support is owed." Id. § 2115-a.
27 One situation wherein the words "found in" may be applicable is a case
where the state has provided support for an abandoned dependent who is
neither domiciled nor residing within the state. For instance, a child ordinarily
cannot establish a domicile or residence apart from its parents. See, e.g., People
ex rel. McGrath v. Gimler, 60 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 270 App.
Div. 949, 62 N.Y.S.2d 846 (2d Dep't 1946); In re Cooper's Guardianship, 65
N.Y.S.2d 643 (Surr. Ct. 1946).
28 The procedure of the two states need not be identical; it is sufficient if
the statutes are essentially the same in design and purpose. Florence v. Florence,
207 Misc. 177, 136 N.Y.S.2d 847 (Child. Ct. 1955); Commonwealth ex rel.
Shaffer v. Shaffer, 175 Pa. Super. 100, 103 A.2d 430 (1954).
29 For a tabulation of the duties of support in the forty-eight states, see
Summaries Of Basic JDuties Of Support Imposed By State Laws, 9A U.L.A.
79-91 (Supp. 1955).
30 "(a) Husband liable for support of his wife;
(b) Father liable for support of his child or children under seventeen
years of age;
(c) Mother liable for support of her child or children under seventeen
years of age whenever the father of such child or children is dead,
or cannot be found, or is incapable of supporting such child or
children;
(d) Parents severally liable for support of their child seventeen years
of age or older whenever such child is unable to maintain himself
and is likely to become a public charge;
(e) Wife liable for support of her husband if he is incapable of sup-
porting himself;
(f) Adult person liable for support of his or her parents;
(g) Grandparent liable for support of his or her grandchild or grand-
children." N.Y. UNIFORM SUPPORT OF DEPENDENTS LAW § 2113.
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Fdr example, Section 2113(b)- provides that a father is'liable for- sup-
port of his child under seventeen years of age. Suppose, a -dependent
child eighteen years of age commences -a.proceeding in a jurisdiction
where the law 'provides that a father is liable,-for children under
twenty-one- years and the ,petition is forwarded, to New York as the
responding state.,- Shall New York apply the law of the foreign.juris-
diction? Suppose New York is acting as the, mitiating state,, will it
take jurisdiction over :, proceeding. in which the petitioner, would not
be entitled to -support! under New York law,- but could get a. support
decree -under the'law!,bf the, state -wherem-the obligor resdes,.or, is
found? 'An indication of, the answer to the- latter- question,.may- be
found inan, examination of "Vincem '" %&, "Vincenza," 3 1 the firstcas.
to arise under the New York law. The decision in that case brought
to light a deficiency in the legislation which has since. been-,remedied'
but the court's reasoning .as-to, jurisdiction overthe depencfent is.stjll
applicable to the law as presently amended, Theproceeding was com-
menced in New York by a-fa:ther against his. five adult children, resi-
dents of New Jersey In refusing'to entertain, the petition; the -court
held that since there was no-duty imposed. -upon a child to support
his parent under Section 3 of -the New York law,3 2 it. could, not ta, e
jurisdiction. It, would appear from this decision that,.a petitioner
must meet the requirements of Section 2113 before the courts of- New
York will entertain, jurisdiction. _ This conclusion is-borne, out by the
fact that if the respondent enters a defense which raises a. doubt as
to the status of the petitioner, the responding state, will return the
proceeding to the initiating state for a determination of that, status,
Thus, where a respondent in Connecticut contested the- legitimacy, of
a child, -the Connecticut court returned the proceedings to the New
York court to decide the question of legitimacy 'I"
The case of Ross v,. Ross 3 4 answers the question regarding the
position of New York when acting as the responding, state, In.-that
case the petitioner was awarded alimony pursuant ,to a, California
divorce decree. The California reciprocal daw 35 provided that the
obligation to support " includes any .duty- of support imposed
by any court order, decree or- judgment . ., whether incidental-.to a
proceeding for divorce - or otherwise." a1 :-The petitioner relying
on that section, commenced a proceeding in California. The petition
was sent, to New York as the responding state. The New York court
-dismissed the proceeding, holding that, the petitionet' was, bound, by
the, law of New York;, since.the New York statute did-not provide
31197 Miisc. 1027, 98 N.Y.S.2d 470 (N.Y. Dom. Rel., Ct. 1950).
32 Laws of N.Y. 1949, c. 807 (currently N.Y. ,UIFoRii SPPO'RT opDEPEN-
DrxTs LAW § 2113).
33 See In re Miller, 114 N.Y.S.2d 304 (Child. Ct. 1952).
34206 Misc. 1073, 136 N.Y.S.2d 23 (Child. Ct. 1954).,
3! CAL. Ciyv. PRoc, CoDF- Axrx. §1650 (West 1955).
361d. § 1653(6).
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any corresponding duty-torsupport an ex-wife, the court had no juris-
diction to grant relief.
It may be concluded from the statute itself and from the Ross
and "Vincenzd" cases, that a petitioner must be a party entitled to
support under the laws of both the initiating and responding states.
Such an approach, however, limits itself to the law of the jurisdiction
wherein the respondent is found; it fails to take into consideration
the whereabouts of the respondent during that period of time for
which support is sought.37 Apparently an obligor could live for a
length of time in a reciprocal jurisdiction in which he would be under
a particular duty of support, move to a reciprocal jurisdiction wherein
no similar duty is imposed, and thereby escape liability entirely, both
past and future.
The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act,38 though
providing substantially the same procedure as the New York law,
differs in its approach as to the applicable law. Section 7 of that act
provides that the duties of support which are applicable are those im-
posed under the law of the state wherein the obligor was present dur-
ing the time for which support is sought. Such a solution obviates
the possibility of an obligor leaving a state wherein a duty of support
would be imposed and establishing a residence in another state, in
order to avoid paying accrued support claims. It does, however,
create a situation where a court may require payment in fulfillment
of support obligations which are not otherwise locally enforceable.
The advantage of the New York rule lies in the fact that a state need
not enforce a duty of support which is contrary to its own public
policy.39 It appears, however, that under both laws an obligor could
avoid payments for future support by moving to a jurisdiction which
does not impose any duty upon him.
Until there is a uniform solution of the choice of law problem,
conflict is bound to exist, especially between those jurisdictions which
have adopted the New York law and those which have adopted the
Uniform Act. For example, the New York law makes no provision
for criminal enforcement, while the Uniform Act provides for a
method of extradition of obligors.40  Section 6 of that act, however,
provides for relief from its extradition provisions where the obligor
submits to the jurisdiction of the court and complies with its orders.
In Ex parte Susnajn,41 the petitioner bad complied with an order of a
responding California court directing him, under the California uni-
form support law, to make payments for support of his children in
37 See von Otterstedt, Reciprocal Support Legislation, CURRENT TRENDS IN
STATE LEGIsLuvroN 165, 241 (1952).
38 This act has been adopted by forty-four states. See table in 9A U.L.A.
68 (Supp. 1955).
39 See note 37 supra.
40 UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 5.
41 116 Cal. App. 2d 698, 254 P.2d 161 (1953).
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New York. He was subsequently imprisoned in California under a
warrant of extradition issued in a New York criminal proceeding for
abandonment of the children. He sued in California for a writ of
habeas corpus, relying upon the relief from extradition section of the
California statute.42 The California court dismissed the writ holding
that, since the New York law has no provision for criminal proceed-
ings, it was not substantially similar or reciprocal with the California
statute in respect to extradition relief. Therefore, such relief was not
available to one held under a New York extradition warrant. The
prime purpose of reciprocal legislation is to facilitate the ease with
which support payments can be collected from errant obligors.43  In
the Susman case the absence of a relief from extradition provision in
the New York law resulted in the forcible separation of an obligor
from a source of income and placed the burden of support upon New
York State-the very evils which the New York Support of Depen-
dents Law seeks to avoid. It is submitted that a provision granting
relief from extradition would bring the New York statute more in
line with its stated objectives.
Constitutionality
The novel procedure of reciprocal support legislation, involving
cooperation between two states, has given rise to constitutional objec-
tions.4 4 Such arguments, however, have not met with success. One
of the first attacks on reciprocal legislation was made in the Kentucky
case of Duncan v. Smith.45  The court there summarily dismissed the
contention that such a statute violates the privileges and immunities
clause of the ConstitutiQn, stating that: "there is no merit in this
ground, because the Act grants the same privileges to citizens of
other states as it does to citizens of Kentucky." 46 Neither is the pro-
cedure followed under the reciprocal laws a violation of due process. 47
Both the petitioner and the respondent have an opportunity to be
heard in their own court, both have the right to testify and to cross-
examine adverse witnesses. 48  Since proceedings for support have
always been considered a matter cognizable in equity, the right to
42 CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1661 (West 1955).
4
:3N.Y. UNIFORM SUPPORT OF DEPmDENTS LAW § 2111 states: "The pur-
pose of this uniform act is to secure support in civil proceedings for dependent
wives, children and poor relatives from persons legally responsible for their
support."
44 For a discussion of the possible constitutional questions, see Brockelbank,
Is The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement Of Support Act Constitutional?,
31 ORE. L. REv. 97-110 (1952).
45 262 S.W.2d 373 (Ky. 1953).46 Id. at 378.
47 Smith v. Smith, 125 Cal. App. 2d 154, 270 P.2d 613 (1954).
48 See Whittlesey v. Bellah, 130 Cal. App. 2d 182, 278 P.2d 511, cert. denied,
350 U.S. 821 (1955).
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trial by jury does not apply.49 Similarly, because the action is civil
in nature and not criminal, no right of confrontation exists,50 not-
withstanding the fact that in some jurisdictions the respondent may be
required to post a bond and may be put on probation," thereby giving
the proceedings a quasi-criminal character. The most general con-
stitutional objection has been that the reciprocal laws violate Article I,
Section 10, of the United States Constitution which provides that:
"No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . . enter into
any Agreement or Compact with another State .... ,, 52 The simple
answer to this objection is that the reciprocal law does not bear any
aspect of an agreement between the states since each state is free to
repeal or amend the law at any time.58 Even if such law were found
to be an "implied" compact between the states, it does not necessarily
follow that such legislation is unconstitutional. 54 Compacts have been
made between states without the consent of Congress. 55 The area of
cooperation between the states has been broadened in recent years, and
unless a compact between states is such that it impinges on the politi-
cal powers of Congress, consent may be inferred from congressional
silence. 56
Conclusion
The effectiveness of reciprocal support legislation can be measured
in part by the amount of money which has been collected through its
operation. That dependents are availing themselves of the New York
law is manifested by the number of new cases under its provisions in
the Family Division of the Domestic Relations Court of New York
City. In 1955 that court tried a total of 3,423 cases under the New
York law.5 7 This is a significant increase over the 939 cases proc-
essed in 1951; in that year the Domestic Relations Court collected
$83,836.58.- s In 1952 the court collected $219,044.26; 59 in 1953,
49 Commonwealth ex rel. Warren v. Warren, 204 Md. 467, 105 A.2d 488
(1954).
50 Duncan v. Smith, 262 S.W.2d 373 (Ky. 1953); Freeman v. Freeman, 226
La. 410, 76 So.2d 414 (1954).
51 N.Y. UNIFORM SUPPORT OF DEPENDENTS LAW § 2116(k).
52 Brockelbank, Is The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement Of Support Act
Constitutional?, 31 ORE. L. REV. 97, 98 (1952).
53 See Duncan v. Smith, supra note 50.
54 Bruce, The Compacts And Agreements Of States With One Another And
With Foreign Powers, 2 MINN. L. REv. 500-16 (1918).
55 For a list of interstate agreements without the consent of Congress, see
Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clause Of The Constitution-A Study
In Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 749-54 (1925).
56 Bruce, supra note 54, at 516.
57 TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DOMESTIc RELATIONS COURT OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK 15 (1955).
58 REPORT OF THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE COOPERATION
168 (1953).
59 Ibid.
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$493,468.62,6' and in 1954 the figure jumped to $747,346.00.61 The
cases processed in 1955 resulted in collections for dependents of
$1,198,937.76.62 Of this total, $592,194.34 63 was collected by courts
of other states as a result of actions initiated in New York.
Thus, there is no doubt as to the value of this interstate pro-
cedure. Its significance, however, lies not only in the fact that it has
brought relief to persons who would otherwise, for all practical pur-
poses, remain remediless; in a broader sense, its success has demon-
strated the value of reciprocal legislation. Such legislation in other
areas of the law will substantially prevent defendants from avoiding
liability by the simple expedient of crossing state lines.
PUNISHING PARENTS IN THE CHILDREN'S COURTS
Punishing parents of delinquent and neglected children is hardly
more civilized than burning witches, in the judgment of some writers.'
This school of thought has created a straw man, a fantastic image of
an opposite school-those who would punish for punishment's sake.
2
60 REPORT OF THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE COOPERATION
189 (1954).
61 REPORT OF THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTE ON INTERSTATE COOPERATION
281 (1955).
62 TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS COURT OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK 30 (1955).
63 Ibid.
1 "'Parents need reassurance and strengthening, rather than criticism....
Our entire approach to parents should be one of interest and help, rather than
of blame.' (Quoted from a report of its Executive Director Herschel Alt for
the Child Guidance Institute of the Jewish Board of Guardians.)" Citrin v.
Belcastro, 196 Misc. 272, 282, 91 N.Y.S.2d 275, 285 (Child. Ct. 1949) (quoted
with approval). "'Parents of delinquent children need help, riot jails, fines or
threats and punishment.'" Id. at 287 (statement of Mr. Maximilian Moss, in
a public debate, January 11, 1949, quoted with approval).
2 "1 am weary of the old slogan in regard to juvenile delinquents: 'It is
really the parents who are to blame. They should be punished.' Are not these
unhappy parents already sufficiently punished? They have spent miserable years
with themselves and with each other." Irene Kawin (Deputy Chief Probation
Officer, Cook County, Chicago), Family Dissension as a Factor in Delinquency,
YEAR BOOK OF THE NATIONAL PROBATION ASSOCIATION 76 (1946), cited in Citrin
v. Belcastro. supra note 1 at 282, 91 N.Y.S.2d at 285. "'We, in the Children's
Bureau, have been much concerned about the way in which the idea that parents
of children who come into court must be punished appears to be gaining ground
throughout the country. Apparently no distinction is made between situations
in which parents by deliberate and overt acts have contributed to the delinquency
of their children and parents who have neglected to give their children guidance
by reason of their own handicaps and limitations, to say nothing of situations
in which the cause of misbehavior is beyond the control of parents, as, for
1956)
